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Abstract—Securing wireless communication, being inherently
vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks, becomes more
challenging in resource-constrained networks like Internet-of-
Things. Towards this, physical layer security (PLS) has gained
significant attention due to its low complexity. In this paper,
we address the issue of random inter-node distances in secrecy
analysis and develop a comprehensive quality-of-service (QoS)
aware PLS framework for the analysis of both eavesdropping and
jamming capabilities of attacker. The proposed solution covers
spatially stochastic deployment of legitimate nodes and attacker.
We characterise the secrecy outage performance against both
attacks using inter-node distance based probabilistic distribution
functions. The model takes into account the practical limits
arising out of underlying QoS requirements, which include the
maximum distance between legitimate users driven by transmit
power and receiver sensitivity. A novel concept of eavesdropping
zone is introduced, and relative impact of jamming power
is investigated. Closed-form expressions for asymptotic secrecy
outage probability are derived offering insights into design of
optimal system parameters for desired security level against
the attacker’s capability of both attacks. Analytical framework,
validated by numerical results, establishes that the proposed
solution offers potentially accurate characterisation of the PLS
performance and key design perspective from point-of-view of
both legitimate user and attacker.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication owing to its open and broadcast
nature is highly vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming
attacks. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) has recently
drawn remarkable attention of the researchers in resources
constrained wireless networks like Internet of Things (IoT) [2].
Various PLS techniques have been reported in the literature
with a major focus on eavesdropping attack and friendly
jamming. Here, legitimate nodes leverage the interference to
secure the communication and the attacker is restricted to act
as a mere passive adversary [3]–[7]. However, the attacker
may also use the interference to its advantage by jamming the
legitimate reception other than eavesdropping. It is, therefore,
of interest to study the attacker in both eavesdropping and jam-
ming modes. Furthermore, spatial configurations of legitimate
B. Ahuja and R. Bose are with the Bharti School of Telecommunication
Technology and Management, IIT Delhi,110016 New Delhi. R. Bose is also
affiliated with IIIT Delhi. e-mail: (bhawna.ahuja,rbose)@iitd.ac.in
D. Mishra is with the Department of School of Electrical Engineering
and Telecommunications, UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia (e-mail:
d.mishra@unsw.edu.au).
This work has been supported by the Department of Electron and Inform.
Technol., Govt. of India under Vishvesvaraya PhD Fellowship scheme.
A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at IEEE ICC in
Shanghai, China, May 2019[1].
nodes and attackers are, in general, modelled in deterministic
manner. This assumption is only valid if the location of
the node is known. Therefore, appropriate modelling of a
stochastic network is needed to investigate the critical role of
random inter-node separations on secrecy performance when
the exact location information is not available.
A. Related Art
PLS is extensively explored to analyse secrecy capacity (SC)
and secrecy outage probability (SOP) in various scenarios
including High SNR regime [8]–[11]. In [9], artificial noise
is exploited to enhance security in multiple-input single-
output non-orthogonal multiple access (MISO-NOMA) sys-
tems by developing a secrecy beamforming scheme. Impact
of imperfect channel state information (CSI) is also widely
explored in analysing the network performance [10], [11]
when perfect CSI is not available. However, these works
ignored the randomness caused by large-scale propagation
losses. There is another line of research exploring the se-
cure communication in spatial stochastic networks [12]–[15].
These works explore the secrecy performance under a passive
eavesdropper assuming the spatial distribution of the nodes as
a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) which may be
a good approximation for large-scale networks with known
network density. The stationary and isotropic properties of
homogeneous PPP consider that characteristics of network as
viewed from a node’s aspect are similar for all the nodes.
However, this assumption is not valid in practical networks,
especially having a finite number of nodes within a given
area [16]. Further, it is incapable of analysing the average
performance measures at a randomly deployed node which has
significant importance in realistic networks. Some scenarios
showing limitations of above models under Device-to-Device
(D2D) or sensor networks has been examined in [17], [18].
Apart from aforementioned works, studies in [19]–[21]
exhibit a recent research interest on hybrid attackers that can
either eavesdrop or jam. The authors have investigated the full
duplex attacker in [22], [23] where passive eavesdropping and
active jamming are performed simultaneously. In [24] secrecy
performance of a wireless network with randomly deployed
hybrid attackers is analysed using stochastic geometry tools
and random matrix theory. Recently, much attention is being
paid to the utilisation of distance distributions as a complement
to PPP models for performance analysis in wireless networks
[17], [18] without considering secrecy requirements.
2B. Research Gap and Motivation
As noted in the literature survey, PLS in spatial stochastic
networks is mainly studied under the assumption of homo-
geneous PPP based deployment of nodes [12]–[15], [24]
which are non-viable in several practical scenarios [17], [18].
Moreover, most studies of stochastic networks consider a
passive attacker that can only eavesdrop. Recently, works in
[19]–[21] have shown the growing interest in hybrid attackers.
But, above-mentioned works consider the deterministic path-
loss. The authors in [24] have studied the hybrid attacker
considering random path-loss, however, analysis is done under
the PPP assumption and available perfect CSI of the users
to the source. These observations reveal that secrecy analysis
in a spatial stochastic network for a general scenario under
eavesdropping as well as jamming mode of the attacker is
still an open research problem. In practical networks including
IoT and D2D, legitimate nodes as well as attacker may be
deployed randomly in the deployment regions; consequently,
the exact location of any node may not be available. Fur-
thermore, connection between two nodes will be set up when
the geographical separation between them is smaller than a
predefined threshold for retaining Quality-of-Service (QoS).
In a similar way, attacker’s capabilities to eavesdrop and jam
also influence the secrecy performance; hence they are indirect
measure of QoS attributes from attacker’s point of view.
Eavesdropping capability is practically constrained by hard-
ware limitations while jamming capability is constrained by
power consumption. It is to be mentioned here that these QoS-
governing parameters did not get due attention in literature.
These facts motivate the study of this work for developing a
practical and comprehensive stochastic model so as to quantify
secrecy performance in a realistic manner.
C. Key Contributions
This work, aimed at filling the mentioned research gap, has
the following key contributions:
• We have proposed a novel generalised QoS-aware
stochastic spatial PLS to investigate secrecy analysis
in the presence of an attacker with both capabilities-
eavesdropping and jamming. Here, the key aspect is that
our model allows any arbitrary location for nodes within
the deployment region (Section 2).
• First-time characterisation of attacker’s eavesdropping
capability is provided in terms of novel eavesdropping
zone concept. The proposed model also incorporates
the restriction being imposed on the maximum distance
between legitimate nodes arising out of the underlying
QoS requirement. Considering these practical constraints,
the distribution functions of the distances and SNRs of
legitimate, eavesdropping and jamming links are derived.
Closed-form expressions are also derived for ratio dis-
tributions of legitimate-to-attacker link SNRs. This is a
vital figure of merit being applied to derive the secrecy
performance measures (Section 3).
• Using probabilistic distance based distributions, we ob-
tain expression for secrecy outage probability having
considered attacker’s eavesdropping capability. As such
distribution functions could be used in a class of gener-
alised practical scenarios. We also derived closed-form
expressions for SOP in asymptotic scenario (Section 4).
• Probabilistic characterisation of secrecy outage is also
provided having considered attacker’s jamming capabil-
ity. For this case also, SOP is derived in closed-form for
asymptotic case (Section 4).
• A generalised framework is provided for different possi-
ble deployment configurations for legitimate nodes and
attacker. Also, novel and significant analytical insights
about designing of different system parameters are pro-
vided under eavesdropping and jamming attacks. Max-
imum allowed separation between legitimate nodes are
determined for achieving desired secrecy performance
from the user’s perspective, while the optimal value of
eavesdropping range and jamming power are investigated
from the attacker’s perspective. (Section 5).
• Numerical results validate the proposed analysis and
present secrecy-aware key design perspective by
analysing the impact of inter-node distances on secrecy
performance. The relative severity of eavesdropping and
jamming capabilities of attacker are also compared. It
is shown that attacker must have more transmit power
than legitimate source to create more adverse conditions
during jamming as compared to eavesdropping provided
that it is capable to eavesdrop in entire deployment range
(Section 6).
D. Novelty and Scope
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
adopts a probabilistic distance-based practical model with
consideration of the real-time constraints in terms of QoS-
controlling parameters for secrecy analysis under eavesdrop-
ping as well as jamming. We also propose eavesdropping
zone concept to incorporate the effect caused by eavesdropping
capability of attacker and present novel analysis on the impact
of stochastic inter-node distances on secrecy outage.
Scope of this work includes, though not limited to, de-
velopment of a system with desired secrecy performance by
exploiting the randomness of inter-node distances. This work,
providing insights on designing of parameters of legitimate
nodes and attacker, can be extended to multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) model. Directional beam-forming can be
applied to enhance the secrecy further. Additional insights can
also be obtained by considering different fading environments.
Another important extension of the work may include the
selection of appropriate attacking mode and optimisation of
designing parameters of attacker with the objective of min-
imising the achievable secrecy transmission rate. Though the
widespread utility of the derived closed-form expressions for
secrecy analysis is constrained by high SNR, they provide
lower bounds on SOP with the positive SC to give useful in-
sights. There is a class of practical applications that can benefit
from proposed designs. These include small cell networks,
IoT networks, ad-hoc networks where nodes are deployed
within a small cell area. Hence, the impacts of leakage due to
wiretapping and interference due to jamming are much greater
than noise in the channel.
3II. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the proposed system model
including the spatially stochastic network topology, QoS-aware
PLS model, channel model along with link SNR and SC
definitions for background setup of the problem for both
eavesdropping and jamming modes of attacker.
A. Network topology
We consider a secure communication IoT scenario com-
prising of uniformly deployed multiple source-user pairs,
where each pair is allocated orthogonal resources in terms
of a dedicated time slot, or set of sub-carriers. The ongoing
communication is assumed to be under security threat from
a hybrid attacker with half-duplex capability. It can over-hear
ongoing transmission as an eavesdropper through wiretapping
or can act as a jammer causing interference to the information
flow [19]–[21]. It is further assumed to be present within
deployment region with some statistical information about its
location. However, the relative distances between source, user
and attacker are unknown to each other exactly. Adopting
this orthogonal multi-access IoT setup, we can focus on any
randomly chosen source-user pair and investigate the impact
of attackers presence on the ongoing secure transmission.
It may be noted that this discussion and the proceeding
analysis holds for any randomly-selected source-user pair.
Here, such an information source S and legitimate user U are
assumed to be spatially distributed with uniform distribution
in deployment region of radius R. Whereas, the attacker A
can be randomly located anywhere in the deployment region.
Without loss of generality, we explore secrecy performance
assuming A to be located at the origin, as depicted in Fig. 1.
Novel investigations are carried out under eavesdropping and
jamming mode separately. Here,A is also considered as an IoT
device so as to invade the network with malicious intentions
by disguising itself. Considering form-factor constraints and
lower hardware complexity of IoT devices, all nodes, including
attacker, are assumed to be equipped with a single antenna
[25]–[28].
B. QoS-Aware PLS Model
The proposed model investigates the PLS based secrecy
metrics under eavesdropping as well as jamming. Here the
phrase “QoS-aware” is associated with the obtaining of secrecy
QoS requirements through critical design parameters of user
as well as attacker from their respective point of view. These
parameters include the distance threshold D, deployment
range R and source power PS from the user’s perspective.
On the other hand, attacker’s parameters like eavesdropping
range r and jamming power PJ also represent the capabilities
to impact the network secrecy performance. Hence, they reflect
the indirect measure of QoS attribute from attackers perspec-
tive. The proposed model first time characterises the secrecy
performance by considering the real-world constraints in terms
of these parameters defined by the underlying QoS require-
ments. Following this, the maximum possible geographical
distance between S and U has been restricted to D determined
by the required QoS. The distance parameter D is utilised
to ensure the minimum QoS requirement over S- U link.
Further, for taking hardware limitations of A into account,
we consider that under eavesdropping mode, the A remains
effective in the disc area defined as eavesdropping zone with
centre A and radius r. Here, r is defined as the eavesdropping
range of A. It represents the maximum distance, to which A
can eavesdrop the legitimate signal. We have categorised all
possible deployment scenario of S and U with respect to A’s
eavesdropping zone into the four cases as illustrated in Fig. 1.
These are:
• Case 1: Both S and U are deployed within the A’s
eavesdropping zone, i.e., d
SA
< r and d
UA
< r.
• Case 2 : S is deployed within A’s eavesdropping zone
while U is outside, i.e., d
SA
< r and r ≤ d
UA
< R.
• Case 3 : U is deployed within A’s eavesdropping zone
while S is outside, i.e., r ≤ d
SA
< R and d
UA
< r.
• Case 4 : Both S and U both are deployed outside
A’s eavesdropping zone, i.e., r ≤ d
SA
< R and
r ≤ d
UA
< R.
Here, the distance between node i and j is represented by
d
ij
, ∀ i, j = {S,U ,A}.
On the other hand, under jamming mode, A sends its
signal with jamming power PJ as interference to degrade
the legitimate reception. In analogy with eavesdropping mode,
where r controls the strength of attacker, PJ plays the same
role and regulates the attacking capability in case of jamming.
Hence, the effective region of the A depends upon PJ in
jamming mode.
C. Channel Model
All the links and hence their SNR are assumed to be in-
dependent due to different transmitting and receiving antenna
gains, polarisation losses and small-scale fading at legitimate
nodes and attacker [12]. The channel gain of the link between
node i and j is represented by gij and modelled as:∣∣g
ij
∣∣2 = aij(
d
ij
)θ , ∀ i, j = {S,U ,A} . (1)
Here θ is path-loss exponent,and a
ij
accounts for the channel
parameters like fading and antenna gains of the link between
node i and j. It is to emphasise that being an external entity,
A does not cooperate with IoT setup towards revealing its
location. It is also a well-known fact that when the exact
distance between communicating nodes d
ij
is unknown, the
large-scale fading has a dominating impact whereas small-
scale fading revolves around path-loss [29, Fig. 2.1]. There-
fore, for analytical tractability, we consider mean channel
fading gain of the respective link to incorporate the small-scale
fading [12], [13] and focus on random long term fading in the
development of analytical framework in detail leaving the joint
analysis of both as a separate investigation for future work.
While for comprehensive performance evaluation, we analyse
the impact of small-scale fading randomness on designing
of system parameter via simulation in result section. For
realistic analysis, we consider that only statistical information
is available about CSI for all the links.
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Fig. 1: QoS-aware stochastic spatial PLS model with attacker in eavesdropping and jamming mode.
D. Background Setup of the Problem
For eavesdropping mode, the received signals y
SU
and y
SA
by U and A are represented by:
y
SN
= xS
√
PSgSN + wN , N ∈ {U ,A} , (2)
where xS is the zero mean and unit variance signal transmitted
by S, and PS is the transmit power of S. In (2), gSN
represents channel gain for legitimate and eavesdropping links
respectively for N ∈ {U ,A} where legitimate link refers for
S-U link and eavesdropping link refers for S-A link. Lastly,
wN represents zero mean additive white Gaussian noise with
variance σ2 as received at node N . Without loss of generality,
we simply assume that they are identical. The corresponding
SNR of legitimate link and eavesdropping link can be obtained
as:
γ
SN
=
PS |gSN |
2
σ2
=
κ
SN
(d
SN
)θ
, with κ
SN
,
PSaSN
σ2
. (3)
The maximum achievable rate for the transmission in the
presence of the A as an eavesdropper is given by the SC and
defined for eavesdropping attack as [30]:
CEs= [log2(1 + γSU )− log2(1 + γSA)]
+=
[
log2
1 + γ
SU
1 + γ
SA
]+
,
(4)
where [x]+ = max[x, 0]. Alternatively, when the A works
as a jammer to disrupt the legitimate channel, the signal y
SU
received by U can be represented as:
y
SU
= xS
√
PSgSU + xJ
√
PJ gAU + wU , (5)
where xJ is the zero mean and unit variance signal transmitted
by A, and PJ is the jamming power of A. The channel gain
associated with jamming link is represented as: g
AU
as defined
above. Here, jamming link refers to the A−U link. When A
is in jamming mode, the maximum achievable rate is defined
as SC and given as [31], [32]:
CJs = log2
(
1 +
PS |gSU |
2
PJ |gAD |
2
+ σ20
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ
SU
1 + γ
AU
)
.(6)
where γ
AU
is SNR of jamming link. It can be obtained as:
γ
AU
=
PJ |gAU |
2
σ2
=
κ
AU
(d
AU
)θ
, with κ
AU
=
PJ aAU
σ2
. (7)
III. DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS OF STOCHASTIC
DISTANCES AND SNRS
This section presents the novel QoS-aware distance and
SNR distributions for legitimate link S-U , eavesdropping link
S-A, and jamming link A-U using the disk point picking
and disk line picking distributions given by a new geomet-
ric probability technique [33]. These distributions enable us
to derive corresponding distance and SNR distributions for
any deployment configuration in our generalised model. For
instance, if S is considered at origin, and U and A are
randomly deployed, then the distances of S-U and S-A links
follow disk point picking distribution while distance of A-
U link follows disk line picking distribution. Alternatively, if
all the three nodes are randomly deployed, distances of all the
links follow the disk line picking distributions. This discussion
is more elaborated in Section 5. Thus, here we derive the
corresponding distributions for configuration considered in the
proposed system model. Additionally, ratio distributions of S-
U -to- S-A link SNRs and S-U -to- A-U link SNRs are also
derived with no loss of generality.
A. Distance Distributions for Legitimate, Eavesdropping and
Jamming Links
To obtain the distributions of SNR for the legitimate,
eavesdropping and jamming links, we first investigate the
corresponding distance distributions defined as PDF fd
SU
(l) of
distance d
SU
, PDF fd
SA
(l) of distance d
SA
and PDF fd
AU
(l)
of distance d
AU
as follows:
1) fd
SU
(l): It is provided by Proposition 1 with the consid-
eration of practical constraint on maximum distance between
S and U .
Proposition 1. The PDF fd
SU
(l) of distance d
SU
is given
below subject to the condition that the maximum distance
between S and U is restricted to D.
fd
SU
(l|l ≤ D)
,


2l
FdSU (D)R
2
(
1−
B l2
4R2
( 12 ,
3
2 )
B( 32 ,
1
2 )
)
, l < D ≤ 2R,
0, otherwise.
(8)
where Fd
SU
(D) = Pr(l < D) =
D2
R2
− D
2
R2B( 32 ,
1
2 )
BD2
R2
(
3
2 ,
1
2
)
−
BD2
R2
(
3
2 ,
3
2
)
, Bx(p, q) =
∫ x
0
tp−1(1−t)q−1dt is an incomplete
5beta function and B(p, q) =
∫ 1
0
tp−1(1 − t)q−1dt is an
complete beta function.
Proof. Given an n-dimensional ball of radius R, disk line
picking distribution i.e., the distribution of the distances be-
tween two points chosen at random within the ball is given by
a new geometric probability technique [33, eq.(28)]. For circle
of radius R, i.e., a special case of n = 2, PDF for the distance
between two random points representing nodes S and U with
uniform node distribution, is reduced to
fd
SU
(l) =
2lI
1− l
2
4R2
(
3
2 ,
1
2
)
R2
, 0 < l ≤ 2R, (9)
where Ix(a, b) =
Bx(a,b)
B(a,b) is defined as a regularised beta
function [33, eq.(29)]. In this work, the maximum distance be-
tween S and U is limited to D. Thus, the required distribution
turns into a right truncated distribution which can be obtained
by limiting the domain of d
SU
to D and re-normalising the
fd
SU
to satisfy
∫D
0
fdSU (l, R|l ≤ D)dl = 1. Hence, the
desired truncated function results in fdSU (l|l ≤ D) ,
fdSU (l)
FdSU (D)
where FdSU (D) = Pr(l < D), is normalising factor. Lastly, by
using identity of beta function Bz(a, b) = B(a, b)−B1−z(b, a)
[34, eq. (06.19.17.0008.01)], we find fd
SU
as given by (8).
2) fd
SA
(l) and fd
AU
(l): Given a circle having radius R
with uniform node distribution, the PDF for the distance of a
point from the centre is well known in literature [35, eq.(20)]
as disk point picking distribution. Following that, The PDF
fd
SA
(l) of distance d
SA
and fd
AU
(l) of distance d
AU
is given
by:
fd
NA
(l) ,
2l
R2
, 0 < l ≤ R , (10)
where N ∈ {S,U}. It is to note that d
NA
and d
AN
are the
same in this work.
B. SNR Distributions for Legitimate, Eavesdropping and Jam-
ming Links
To obtain the ratio distribution of SNR of legitimate link
and attacker link, we first investigate the SNR distribution
for individual link including PDF fγ
SU
(x) for legitimate link
SNR, PDF fγ
SA
(y) for eavesdropping link SNR and PDF
fγ
AU
(y) for jamming link SNR.
1) fγ
SU
(x): As observed from (3), γ
SU
is a function of
random variable d
SU
, its PDF is derived by applying random
variable transformation on (8) provided d
SU
is less than D as
follows:
fγ
SU
(x) ,


8u
(
pi − 2Bu
(
1
2 ,
3
2
))
Fd
SU
(D)xpiθ
, x >
κ
SU
Dθ
,
0, otherwise,
(11)
where u =
κ
2
θ
SU
4R2x
2
θ
.
2) fγ
SA
(y): Under eavesdropping mode, A tends to wire-
tap the signal transmitted by S. Therefore, Proposition 2
presents the distribution of SNR for S − A link with the
consideration of restriction on eavesdropping capability.
Proposition 2. When A is in eavesdropping mode, The PDF
fγ
SA
(x) of SNR γ
SA
is given below.
fγ
SA
(y) ,


2αy−
2
θ
−1
θκ−
2
θ
SA
r2
, y >
κ
SA
rθ
,
(1− α)δ(y), y ≤
κ
SA
rθ
,
(12)
where α , r2/R2 represents the probability that S lies within
the eavesdropping zone and δ(y) is used to denote the Dirac
delta function.
Proof. Generalised proposed model enables the legitimate
nodes to be positioned at any place in the circular deployment
region having radius R. But A has capability to eavesdrop the
legitimate transmission only when S lies within the eavesdrop-
ping zone subject to d
SA
< r ( illustrated under cases 1 and
2). The probability of S lying inside the eavesdropping zone
is denoted by α. As observed from (3), being a function of
random variable d
SA
, PDF of γ
SA
can, therefore, be derived
with the help of random variable transformation and (10)
satisfying d
SA
< r as follows:
fγ
SA
(y) ,
2α
θyr2
(
y
κ
SA
)− 2
θ
, y >
κ
SA
rθ
. (13)
In contrast, under the cases 3 and 4, satisfying d
SA
> r,
A is unable for eavesdropping the legitimate signal. For the
purpose of realistic analysis, we may consider this scenario
equivalent to the one when γ
SA
approaches zero. This means
that A has become ineffective. Intuitively, this equivalence is
also supported by a matter of fact that when S lies beyond
the eavesdropping zone, A will be unable to tap the signal
transmitted by S regardless of the distance and SNR between
them. We can express this equivalence mathematically as
follows:
fγ
SA
(y) , (1− α)δ(y), y ≤
κ
SA
rθ
. (14)
By combining (13) and (14), PDF of SNR of S-A link can
be obtained as given in (12).
3) fγ
AU
(y): Under jamming mode, A transmits a signal
with power PJ to interfere with legitimate reception at U .
Therefore, we next present distribution of SNR for A − U
link. PJ reflects the attacker capability of A as a jammer.
Since A is not getting any feedback from U , it is not able to
find that U is in its jamming range or not. Therefore, we are
assuming that A can affect U located anywhere in the region
of deployment having radius R based on its jamming power
PJ . The PDF fγ
AU
(y) of SNR γ
AU
in jamming attack is given
by:
fγ
AU
(y) ,


2
θyR2
(
y
κ
AU
)− 2
θ
, y >
κ
AU
Rθ
,
0, otherwise.
(15)
C. Ratio distribution of Legitimate to Attacker Link SNRs
In this section, the closed-form expressions for PDF
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) of the ratio γ¯
SU
SA
,
γ
SU
γ
SA
for legitimate-to-
eavesdropping link SNRs and PDF f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z) of the ratio
6γ¯
SU
AU
,
γ
SU
γ
AU
of legitimate-to-jamming link SNRs and cor-
responding logarithmic transformations are provided. It is
to be noted that γ
SU
in (11) is derived using underlying
distance distribution given by a distinct geometric probability
technique [33]. It facilitates to obtain the proposed solutions
in the closed-form, which was challenging otherwise. These
PDFs can be utilised as an important tool to obtain analytical
tractable expressions for SOP through logarithmic transforma-
tions under eavesdropping as well as jamming as described in
next section. Therefore, the corresponding logarithmic trans-
formation of ratio PDFs are also provided as flog2(γ¯
SU
SA
) (c) in
eavesdropping and flog2(1+γ¯
SU
AU
) (c) in jamming.
1) f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z): Under eavesdropping mode of A, the cases
3 and 4 may exist with a probability of (1 − α) where
S may appear outside the eavesdropping zone of A. In
this scenario, γ
SA
goes beyond an acceptable threshold to
eavesdrop the signal; A’s channel, therefore, ceases to exist.
This is mathematically represented by the (12). Consequently,
ratio
γ
SU
γ
SA
does not exist for the cases 3 and 4. Next, we
introduce Lemma 1 to provide the PDF of ratio γ¯
SU
SA
for the
cases 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. The PDF f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) of ratio γ¯
SU
SA
of legitimate-
to-eavesdropping link SNRs under the conditions that S lies
within the eavesdropping zone of A is given by:
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) ,


(λE )
− 2
θD4z
2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)θR2r2 −
32(λE)
− 2
θ R2z
2
θ
−1
β1(
D2
4R2
)
Fd
SU
(D)piθr2 ,
∀ 0 < z < λEr
θ
Dθ
,
(λE )
2
θ r2z
− 2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)θR2 −
32(λE )
− 2
θ R2z
2
θ
−1
β1
(
(λE )
2
θ r2
z
2
θ 4R2
)
Fd
SU
(D)piθr2 ,
∀ λEr
θ
Dθ
≤ z <∞,
(16)
where λE =
(
κ
SU
κ
SA
)
and β1(a) = a
2Ba(
1
2 ,
3
2 )− Ba
(
5
2 ,
3
2
)
.
Proof. Using [36, (eq. 6.60)] PDF of γ¯
SU
AU
for the cases 1 and
2 can be expressed as:
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) =
∞∫
yl
yfγ
SU
(zy)fγ
SA
(
y|y >
κ
SA
rθ
)
dy
(a)
=
∞∫
yl
16κ
SA
2
θ y−
2
θ
−1u0
Fd
SU
(D)pizr2θ2
(
pi − 2Bu0
(
1
2
,
3
2
))
dy, (17)
where u0 ,
κ
2
θ
SU
4R2(zy)
2
θ
. Here, (a) is obtained from definition
of fγ
SU
(x) and fγ
SA
(y) given in (11) and (12) for the cases
1 and 2 respectively. Lower limit y
l
of ratio integralis given
by max
(
κ
SU
Dθz
,
κ
SA
rθ
)
and represented in piece-wise form as:
yl =


κ
SU
Dθz
, 0 < z <
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
,
κ
SA
rθ
, z ≥
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
.
(18)
Using integral of incomplete beta function [34, eq.
(06.19.21.0002.01)],
∫
Bz(a, b)dz = zBz(a, b)−Bz(a+ 1, b)
and further simplifying, we can found f
γ¯
SU
SA
as a piece-wise
expression given in (16).
2) flog2(γ¯
SU
SA
) (c): To draw critical insights about SC, PDF
of logarithmic function of SNRs ratio is given as:
flog2(γ¯
SU
SA
) (c) , ln(2)fγ¯SU
SA
(2c) (19)
3) f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z): Lemma 2 provides the PDF of SNRs ratio
under jamming.
Lemma 2. The PDF f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z) of legitimate-to-jamming link
SNRs ratio γ¯
SU
AU
is given below.
f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z) ,


(λJ )
− 2
θD4z
2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)R4 −
32(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
β1
(
D2
4R2
)
Fd
SU
(D) ,
∀ 0 < z <
κ
SU
Rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
,
(λJ )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)θ −
32(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
β1
(
(λJ )
2
θ
4z
2
θ
)
Fd
SU
(D)piθ ,
∀
κ
SU
Rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
≤ z <∞,
(20)
where λJ =
(
κ
SU
κ
AU
)
.
Proof. PDF of γ¯
SU
AU
can be derived similar to Lemma 1
by using fγ
SU
(x) and fγ
AU
(y) defined in (11) and (15)
respectively. The only difference lies in case of jamming that,
γ
SU
γ
AU
exists for entire region of interest of radius R.
4) flog2(1+γ¯
SU
AU
) (c): Under jamming mode, SC depends
upon the logarithmic function of (1 + γ¯
SU
AU
) under high
SNR regime as discussed in Section 4. Therefore, PDF of
log2
(
1 + γ¯
SU
AU
)
is derived to provide analytical insights about
high SNR SC.
flog2(1+γ¯
SU
AU
) (c) , ln(2)fγ¯SU
AU
(2c − 1) (21)
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the impact of random inter-node distances on
the secrecy performance of the proposed system is presented
by adopting secrecy outage probability SOP as a performance
metric. Firstly, SOP for the proposed system model is derived
by considering both modes eavesdropping as well as jamming
of the A. Later, the proposed analysis is extended in high SNR
regime to obtain the closed-form expressions for the SOP.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
Secrecy outage is a state, when instantaneous SC falls below
a target secrecy rate Cst > 0. The probability of secrecy
outage, SOP, is defined [37] as:
pio(Cst) = Pr(C
i < Cst) i ∈ {E ,J } , (22)
where E and J represents eavesdropping and jamming mode
of A respectively.
71) Eavesdropping: In the proposed model, under the cases
1 and 2 when S is deployed inside the eavesdropping zone
as followed from Section 2, SC will follow the definition
provided by (4). It is denoted by CE
1,2
. On the other hand,
under the cases 3 and 4, when S may remain outside the
eavesdropping zone, A is not able to eavesdrop the signal.
Hence, it becomes ineffective. Consequently, conventional SC
given by (4) is reduced to capacity of legitimate channel and
denoted by CE
3,4
. Thus, SC for the proposed system under
eavesdropping mode of A is defined as:
CE ,


CE
1,2
=
[
log2
(
1 + γ
SU
1 + γ
SA
)]+
, γ
SA
>
κ
SA
(r)θ
,
CE
3,4
= log2 (1 + γSU ) , otherwise.
(23)
Consequently, the SOP under eavesdropping mode of A will
be the weighted sum of two outage probabilities given below.
pEo = αp
E
o + (1− α)p
I
o, (24)
where pEo = Pr
(
log2
(
1+γ
SU
1+γ
SA
)
< Cst
)
represents outage
probability when eavesdropper is effective i.e., the cases 1
and 2 and pIo = Pr(log2(1 + γSU ) < Cst) represents outage
probability when eavesdropper becomes ineffective i.e., the
cases 3 and 4. The pEo can be derived as:
pEo = αPr
(
1 + γ
SU
1 + γ
SA
< 2Cst
)
+ (1− α)Pr
(
1 + γ
SU
< 2Cst
)
= α
2Cst∫
0
f 1+γ
SU
1+γ
SA
(z) dz + (1 − α)
2Cst∫
0
f
1+γ
SU
(z) dz
(b)
=
2Cst∫
0

α
∞∫
yl
yf(1+γ
SU
)(zy)f(1+γ
SA
)((y|y >
κ
SA
rθ
+ 1))dy

dz
+ (1− α)
2Cst∫
0
f(1+γ
SU
)dz
(c)
= α
2Cst∫
0
∞∫
yl
16u1y(y − 1)
− 2
θ
−1 (pi − 2Bu1 ( 12 , 32))
Fd
SU
(D)pi(zy − 1)r2θ2κ
SA
− 2
θ
dydz
+ (1− α)

 D2 − u2
Fd
SU
(D)R2
−
8
(
β1
(
x1
4R2
)
− β1
(
D2
4R2
))
Fd
SU
(D)pi

 ,
(25)
Here, (b) is obtained by [36, (eq. 6.60)] for the cases 1
and 2 whereas (c) is obtained by finding the PDF f(1+γ
SU
)
and f(1+γ
SA
) using random variable transformations on (11),
and (12). The y
l
is lower limits of internal integral which
is maximum of lower supports of (1 + γ
SU
) and (1 + γ
SA
)
Hence, yl is max
(
Dθ+κ
SU
Dθz
,
κ
SA
+rθ
rθ
)
and can be given in
piece-wise form as follows:
yl =


κ
SU
Dθz
, 0 < z <
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
,
κ
SA
rθ
, z ≥
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
.
(26)
The first term in (c) represents integral expression for pEo .
Though it cannot be solved analytically due to involvement
of the form
∫
(A + Bx)n(C +Dx)mdx [38, (2.151)], it can
be solved numerically. It is to be mentioned here that the
integral in the second term of (b) represents pIo which is solved
in (c) by using [34, eq. (06.19.21.0002.01)] and algebraic
calculations.
2) Jamming: For the proposed system, the SOP pJo under
jamming mode of A can be given using the equation (6) and
(22) as follows:
pJo =Pr
(
log2
(
1 +
γ
SU
1 + γ
SA
)
< Cst
)
= Pr
((
γ
SU
1 + γ
SA
)
< 2Cst − 1
)
=
2Cst−1∫
0
f γ
SU
1+γ
SA
(z) dz
(d)
=
2Cst−1∫
0
∞∫
yl
yfγ
SU
(zy)f(1+γ
SA
)(y)dydz
(e)
=
2Cst−1∫
0
∞∫
yl
16u1(y − 1)
− 2
θ
(
pi − 2Bu1
(
1
2 ,
3
2
))
Fd
SU
(D)pi(zy)R2θ2κ
SA
− 2
θ
dydz,
(27)
where, (d) is obtained by [36, (eq. 6.60)] and (e) is obtained
by using (11) and finding the PDF f(1+γ
SA
) using random
variable transformations on (12). The y
l
is lower limits of
internal integral which is maximum of lower supports of γ
SU
and (1 + γ
SA
) hence, yl is max
(
κ
SU
Dθz
,
κ
SA
+Rθ
rθ
)
and can be
given in piece-wise form as:
yl =


κ
SU
Dθz
, 0 < z <
κ
SU
Rθ
(κ
SA
+Rθ)Dθ
,
Rθ+κ
SA
Rθ
, z ≥
κ
SU
Rθ
(κ
SA
+Rθ)Dθ
.
(28)
B. Closed-Form Approximation
The analysis presented above provides the integral-based
SOP expressions. To provide additional analytical insights, we
consider high SNR regime and deduce closed-form expres-
sions for SOP for tractable analytical results. This analysis
also provides lower bound on SOP in jamming whereas
under eavesdropping, lower bound on SOP is provided with a
condition of positive secrecy.
1) Eavesdropping: For high SNR regime, received signals
in the S-U and S-A links are relatively higher than noise
power. Hence, γ
SU
≫ 1 and γ
SA
≫ 1 are satisfied when A is
able to eavesdrop the legitimate signal i.e., the cases 1 and 2
for the proposed model and corresponding SC is denoted as
CˆE
1,2
. Therefore, SC for proposed system (23) is reduced to
asymptotic SC defined as:
CˆE ,


CˆE
1,2
=
[
log2
(
γ
SU
γ
SA
)]+
, γ
SA
>
κ
SA
rθ
,
CE
3,4
= log2 (1 + γSU ) , otherwise.
(29)
It is to be mentioned that SOP expression derived for SOP
considering the cases 3 and 4 is analytically tractable. The
respective exact expression is, therefore, retained aiming to
enhance the accuracy of closed-form solutions.
For a special case of positive SC i.e., γ
SU
> γ
SA
, the
proposed asymptotic SC gives the upper bound on SC given
8by (23) as CE ≤ CˆE . Consequently, the corresponding SOP pˆEo
provides lower bound on outage probability with positive SC.
Theorem 1 is introduced to provide closed-form expression
for SOP pˆEo .
Theorem 1. Under eavesdropping attack, SOP pˆEo for a target
secrecy rate Cst > 0 is given by:
pˆEo ,


α
(
(λE )
− 2
θD42
2Cst
θ
2Fd
SU
(D)R2r2 −
32(λE )
− 2
θ R22
2Cst
θ β1(
D2
4R2
)
2Fd
SU
(D)r2
)
+(1− α)
(
D2−u2
Fd
SU
(D)R2 −
8
(
β1( u24R2 )−β1
(
D2
4R2
))
Fd
SU
(D)pi
)
,
∀ 0 < Cst < log2
(
λEr
θ
Dθ
)
α
(
4D2−u3
2R2Fd
SU
(D) −
16R2β2(
D2
4R2
)
piFd
SU
(D)D2 +
4(β3(
u3
4R2
)−β3(
D2
4R2
))
piFd
SU
(D)
)
+(1− α)
(
D2−u2
Fd
SU
(D)R2 −
8
(
β1( u24R2 )−β1
(
D2
4R2
))
Fd
SU
(D)pi
)
,
∀ log2
(
λEr
θ
Dθ
)
≤ Cst,
(30)
with u3 =
r2(λE )
2
θ 2
−2Cst
θ
2R2 , β2(a) = aBa(
1
2 ,
3
2 ) − Ba(
5
2 ,
3
2 ),
and β3(a) = β1(a) +
1
a
Ba(
5
2 ,
3
2 )− Ba(
3
2 ,
3
2 ).
Proof. It is clear from (24) that SOP pˆEo is weighted sum of
two outages probabilities pEo (for cases 1 and 2) and p
I
o ( for
the cases 3 and 4) obtained as below.
Cases 1 and 2: S lies within eavesdropping zone of A with
probability α, and pEo is defined as:
pEo ≈ Pr
(
log2
(
γ¯
SU
SA
)
< Cst
)
= Pr
(
γ¯
SU
SA
< 2Cst
)
=
2Cst∫
0
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) dz
(f)
=
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ∫
0
(
(λE )
− 2
θD4z
2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)R2r2
)
dz +
2Cst∫
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ
(
(λE )
2
θ r2
Fd
SU
(D)R2
)
dz
−
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ∫
0
(
32(λE)
− 2
θR2z
2
θ
−1β1(
D2
4R2 )
Fd
SU
(D)r2
)
dz
+
2Cst∫
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ


32(λE)
− 2
θR2z
2
θ
−1β1
(
(λE )
2
θ r2
z
2
θ 4R2
)
Fd
SU
(D)r2

dz (31)
Here, (f) is obtained using Lemma 1.
Cases 3 and 4: S remains beyond the eavesdropping zone with
(1−α) probability. Under these cases, we consider pIo remains
the same as in (25).
Solving pEo , [34, eq. (06.19.21.0002.01)] and putting values
of pIo and p
E
o in (24), a closed-form expression for SOP in
(30) is obtained.
2) Jamming: In high SNR regime, interference produced
by jamming power has a much greater impact than noise in
the main channel. Hence, for this interference limited case,
the SC given by (6) is reduced to asymptotic SC denoted as
follows:
CˆJ , log2
(
1 +
γ
SU
γ
AU
)
(32)
The CˆJ also provides the upper bound on SC given by (6) as
CJ ≤ CˆJ . Consequently, asymptotic SOP pˆJo corresponding
to CˆJ provides the lower bound on SOP pˆJo in closed-form
as given by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Under jamming attack, SOP for a target secrecy
rate Cst is lower bounded by:
pˆJo ,


λ
− 2
θ
J
D4(2Cst−1)
2
θ
2Fd
SU
(D)R4 −
32(λJ )
− 2
θ (2Cst−1)
2
θ β1(
D2
4R2
)
2Fd
SU
(D) ,
∀ 0 < Cst < log2
(
1 + λEr
θ
Dθ
)
D2−4u4
R2Fd
SU
(D) −
16R2β2(
D2
4R2
)
piFd
SU
(D)D2 +
4(β3(u4)−β3(
D2
4R2
))
piFd
SU
(D) ,
∀ log2
(
1 + λEr
θ
Dθ
)
≤ Cst where u4 =
(λJ )
2
θ
4(2Cst−1)
2
θ
.
(33)
Proof. By using (22) and (32), we obtain:
pˆo
J = Pr
(
log2
(
1 + γ¯
SU
AU
)
< Cst
)
=
2Cst−1∫
0
f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z) dz
(g)
=
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ∫
0
(
(λJ )
− 2
θD4z
2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)R4
−
32(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1β1(
D2
4R2 )
Fd
SU
(D)
)
dz
+
2Cst−1∫
κ
SU
rθ
κ
SA
Dθ

 (λJ )
2
θ z−
2
θ
−1
Fd
SU
(D)θ
−
32(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1β1
(
(λJ )
2
θ
z
4 2
θ
)
Fd
SU
(D)piθ

dz
(34)
Here, (g) is obtained with use of Lemma 2. Using [34, eq.
(06.19.21.0002.01)] and algebraic manipulation, closed-form
asymptotic SOP pˆo
J can be obtained as given in (33).
V. DISCUSSION: MODEL GENERALISATION AND
PARAMETER DESIGNING
In this section, a general discussion about other spatial
configuration of nodes is presented, and it is illustrated that
the proposed analysis represents a generalised framework as
the corresponding secrecy analysis can be derived in a similar
manner. In addition, we discuss the impact of the system
design parameters of legitimate nodes as well as attacker on
secrecy performance. We observe that determining the appro-
priate values of parameters utilising the analytical expressions
derived in Section 4 offers the desired secrecy performance
for legitimate nodes and attacker.
A. Generalisation of the proposed System Model
As discussed in Section 4, analytically tractable secrecy
outage analysis can be performed through having determined
the ratio distribution of SNRs of legitimate to attacker link.
In this section, we illustrate that ratio distribution of SNRs of
9legitimate to attacker link can be derived for other possible
configurations on the similar lines. We examine two promi-
nent configurations considered in the literature, however other
possible configurations can also be analysed with the proposed
generalised framework.
1) S at the origin: In this configuration, A and U are
located stochastically within the deployment region with S at
the centre. Distances d
SU
and d
SA
follow the same distribution
and can be calculated by (10). On the other hand, distance
of link A-U follows the different distribution and can be
computed by (9). As γ
SU
, γ
SA
and γ
AU
are the functions of
random variables d
SU
, d
SA
, and d
AU
respectively as defined by
(3) and (7), their PDFs can be obtained using random variable
transformation. We can now obtain the PDF of the ratio of
γ
SU
to γ
SA
as follows:
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) =


(λE )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
θ
, 0 < z < λE ,
(λE )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
θ
, λE ≤ z <∞.
(35)
Similarly, the PDF of ratio of γ
SU
and γ
AU
can be given as:
f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z)
=


(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
θ
−
32(λJ )
− 2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
β1
(
(λJ )
− 2
θ
4z
− 2
θ
)
piθ
,
∀ 0 < z < 2θλJ ,
16(λJ )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
R2
θD2
−
32(λJ )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1(B( 12 ,
3
2 )−B(
5
2 ,
3
2 ))
piθ
,
∀ 2θλJ ≤ z <∞.
(36)
2) U at the origin: In this configuration, S and A are
located stochastically within the deployment region with U
considered at centre. Here, distances d
SU
and d
AU
follow the
same distribution and can be calculated with the help of (10).
Distance distribution of link S-A can be calculated with the
help of (9). As explained above, fγ
SU
, fγ
SA
and fγ
AU
can be
obtained using random variable transformation. Thus, PDF of
ratio of γ
SU
and γ
SA
is given by:
f
γ¯
SU
SA
(z) =


(λE )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
θ
−
32(λE )
− 2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
β1
(
(λE )
− 2
θ
z
− 2
θ
)
piθ
,
∀ 0 < z < 2θλE ,
32(λE )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
4θ −
32(λE )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
piθ
β4,
∀ 2θλE ≤ z <∞.
(37)
Similarly, PDF of ratio of γ
SU
and γ
AU
can be given as:
f
γ¯
SU
AU
(z) =


(λJ )
− 2
θ z
2
θ
−1
θ
, 0 < z < λJ ,
4(λJ )
2
θ z
− 2
θ
−1
θ
, λJ ≤ z <∞.
(38)
To realise a practical system, QoS constraint of legitimate
nodes such as maximum separation between S-U can be
considered with these configurations as explained in Section
2 and Section 3. Similarly, the concept of eavesdropping
zone can be implemented to consider hardware constraints
of attacker in eavesdropping mode. As it is clear from (35)
to (38) that ratio PDF f
γ¯
SU
SA
and f
γ¯
SU
AU
is available in closed-
form for both configurations. Therefore, SOP for the above-
stated configurations under eavesdropping and jamming mode
respectively can be calculated in closed-form in high SNR
regime as discussed in Section 4. Moreover, system parame-
ters can be designed to get desired secrecy performance, as
explained in the next section.
B. Secrecy QoS Aware Perspective of Design Parameters
In the proposed work, the critical design parameters includ-
ing D, PS , R, r and PJ are leveraged to achieve the desired
secrecy performance with SOP as the QoS parameter. There
is a minimum acceptable level of SOP used as performance
metric, which needs to be maintained for the communication.
The proposed framework can be utilised to attain the intended
secrecy performance through the above-mentioned parameters
classified into two categories:
1) Distance Dependent Parameters: These parameters
include the maximum separation between S and U denoted
by D, the eavesdropping range r and the deployment range
R.
• The distance parameter D: It characterises the S to U
communication range. Larger communication range or
say network coverage needs a greater value of D which
may result in degraded QoS arising out of increasing
path-loss. This condition seeks a trade-off between the
conflicting requirements of achieving higher communica-
tion range while meeting the required QoS. For the given
system model, the maximum value of D is restricted
to Dmax = 2R, the farthest possible distance between
S and U in a circular coverage area. The key insights
leveraging to designing of D for attaining desired secrecy
performance are given as follows:
a) Increasing path-loss with larger D results in reduced
capacity of S-U link, which in turn yields degraded SC
and higher SOP. Hence, pˆio is a monotonically increasing
function of D. Therefore, an acceptable value of SOP
po
th
as per the desired QoS requirements can be obtained
from (30) by setting D = D
th
which is determined as
D
th
=
{
D
∣∣∣ (pˆio = poth
)
∧ (0 ≤ D ≤ Dmax)
}
. Here,
D
th
represents the maximum allowed D for maintaining
an acceptable SOP po
th
. However, it is not possible to
obtain the explicit analytic solution for D
th
because of
highly non-linear terms in (30) and (33). Thus, Golden-
section (GS) based linear search [39] technique is used to
find the solution within (0 < D ≤ Dmax). For D < Dth ,
SOP will fall within the acceptable range. Here, pˆio
represents lower bound on SOP pio under jamming and
eavesdropping, with the condition of positive SC, and
corresponding D
th
thus provides upper bound on the
maximum allowed distance between S − U pair.
b) Since, the maximum distance between S and U is
upper-bounded by D, this results into a lower bound
for SNR and respective capacity C = log2(1 +
κ
SU
Dθ
)
which is guaranteed for legitimate channel in the absence
of A. Therefore, for a given Cst, there exists a unique
threshold point Do =
(
κ
SU
2Cst−1
) 1
θ
such that for D ≤ Do,
outage is attributed by the A only. For D > Do, SOP
increases at a faster rate due to the joint contribution A
10
as well as increased propagation losses caused by larger
D towards outage. Thus, the appropriate setting of D
affects the SOPs pEo and p
J
o and asymptotic SOPs pˆ
E
o and
pˆJo significantly. Do being a function of Cst presents the
QoS-aware design threshold.
c): Under eavesdropping, it is observed further that there
exists another threshold D
sat
=
(
λEr
θ
2Cst
) 1
θ
for a given Cst
and r such that forD < min(D
sat
, Do), pˆ
E
o does not vary
with r. The reason behind this behaviour lies in the fact
that for pIo gets vanish for D ≤ Do and αp
E
o becomes
constant with respect to r for D < D
sat
as depicted from
the first case of (30) after substituting the value of α from
(12). Hence, by keeping D < min(D
sat
, Do), the impact
of r can be neutralised on the security performance.
• The eavesdropping range r: It reflects the capability of
A to eavesdrop the communication. The larger value of r
improves the likelihood of eavesdropping but also results
in a reduction of eavesdropping link capacity caused by
increased path-loss which creates unfavourable conditions
for A. It is also constrained by overheads in hardware
required to decode the tapped signal. It, therefore, be-
comes crucial for A to determine a suitable value of r
to maintain a trade-off between its contradictory nature.
For desired settings of r, significant inferences are drawn
from analytic expression derived in (30) as follows:
a): Since the presence of effective A increases the outage
probability, it results in pEo > p
I
o. We also note that p
E
o
is a decreasing function of r because increased average
path-loss of S-A link with increased r leads to degraded
S-A link capacity and reduced outage probability or
improved secrecy performance. Further, eavesdropping
probability α is an increasing function of r. Using
all these observations, it is revealed that first term of
right-hand side is always positive while second one is
always negative in
∂pˆEo
∂r
=
2r(pEo −p
I
o)
R2
+ r
2
R2
∂pEo
∂r
. This
shows non-monotonic nature of pˆEo in r. We have pro-
vided more insights with numerical investigations later
in the result section. b): The above observation also
reveal existence of a threshold point for r determined
as rsat ,
(
2CstDθ
λE
) 1
θ
, above which, pˆEo will exhibit
a definite trend with r that is unfavourable for A. For
r > rsat, or equivalently Cst < log2
(
λEr
θ
sat
Dθ
)
, αpEo
becomes constant with respect to r as clear from the
first case of (30). Additionally, pIo becomes zero with
r > rsat and D ≤ Do as legitimate channel (in the
absence of effective A) can ensure the given secrecy rate
as discussed above, pˆEo , therefore, becomes independent
of r under these conditions. In other case, with r > rsat
and D > Do, pˆ
E
o exhibits a negative trend with r due
to decrease in (1 − α)pIo with increasing r. Here, p
I
o is
constant in r, but (1 − α) is decreasing function of the
same. From this inference, it can be concluded that A
can reduce its eavesdropping cost by restricting its r to
rsat.
• Deployment range R: It characterises of deployment
region with radius R in which S and U may be randomly
positioned anywhere. A larger value of R results in
reduced capacity for legitimate link caused by the value
of average path-loss. It eventually results in degraded SC.
Furthermore, in the presented system model, R is a radius
of a region where A positioned at the origin. The larger
value of R, therefore, will decrease the likelihood of
eavesdropping for a given r which results in improved
SC under eavesdropping mode. Under jamming mode
also, the average path-loss of A-U channel increases with
increasing R resulting in enhanced secrecy. Thus, the
relation of po may not be monotonic with R. We also
notice that pˆEo is function of
r
R
and D
R
for D ≤ Do
whereas pˆJo is a function of
D
R
. We, therefore, conclude
that R acts as a normalising parameter for D ≤ Do under
eavesdropping and for entire range of D under jamming.
Consequently, for a given SOP requirement, R influences
the maximum possible communication range covering the
legitimate nodes.
2) Power Controlling Parameters: This category include
transmission power of S denoted by PS and transmission
power of J denoted by PJ .
• PS : Under eavesdropping mode of A, PS enhances the
capacity of both S-U and S-A links by enhancing de-
coding rate. Being the difference of these two capacities,
SC shows different behaviour with PS . In the high SNR
regime, SC saturates with Ps and controlled by only
channel gain ratio of S-U to S-A links as clear from
(29). Therefore, the impact of PS on secrecy performance
vanishes under eavesdropping mode in high SNR regime.
On the other hand, PS enhances the capacity of only
S-U link under jamming mode while PJ controls the
A-U link. Consequently, for a given PJ , SC increases
with PS and pˆ
J
o in (33) becomes monotonically de-
creasing function of PS . However, large PS causes high
energy cost at S, and it is also constrained by energy
budget of S. Hence, to attain an acceptable SOP, the
minimum required PS defined as PSth can be found
as PSth =
{
PS
∣∣∣ (pˆJo = poth
)
∧ (0 ≤ PS ≤ PSmax)
}
from (33) using GSS within lower and upper bounds
(0 < PS ≤ PSmax) where PSmax depends upon energy
budget of S.
• PJ : The jamming power PJ , represents the attacker
capability of A in jamming mode. Though a larger value
of PJ is favourable for A, it is also constrained by energy
budget of A. Further, PJ increases the interference to
reception of legitimate signal. Therefore, pˆJo in (33), is
a monotonically increasing function with PJ for a given
PS . Thus, to yield a desired SOP po
th
to legitimate nodes,
the minimum required PJ defined as PJth can be found
as PJth =
{
PJ
∣∣∣ (pˆJo = poth
)
∧ (0 ≤ PJ ≤ PJmax)
}
from (33) using GSS within lower and upper bounds (0 <
PJ ≤ PJmax) where PJmax depends upon energy budget
of A. More specifically pˆJo is increasing function of
PJ
PS
.
However, the rate of increment varies for different value
of
PJ
PS
. A subsequent investigation is done in the result
section.
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we numerically investigate the secrecy performance
of the proposed QoS-aware system model. Unless explicitly
mentioned, we have considered: PS = PJ = 100 mW,
σ2 = −90 dBm, θ = 3 a
SU
= a
SA
= a
AU
= 10−5, Cst = 1
bps/Hz, r = 50 m, R = 100 m referring IoT networks [39],
[40]. We consider that S and U are deployed stochastically
uniformly within a circle of radius R with attacker A at its
centre. The proposed configuration represents a practical ad-
hoc network scenario where nodes can be placed randomly in
the deployment region [18], and an attacker invades the net-
work with a malicious intention of eavesdropping or jamming.
The centre location of A will offer leverage to it the maximal
possible attacking capability. In other words, it depicts the
worst-case scenario in terms of secrecy performance. To deal
with all possible deployment cases, we have considered that
legitimate nodes may lie inside the eavesdropping zone of
radius r or outside of it. The maximum distance between
S and U is restricted to D. We have considered D = r
under eavesdropping and D = R under jamming in validation
with the purpose of fair comparison of other parameters
by keeping maximum distance for legitimate and attacker
links same. For the given system parameters, the value of
distance threshold parameter Do has been determined to 100
m following discussion in Section 5.
A. Validation of analysis
The analytical formulations carried out in Section 3 lay
the foundation for secrecy analysis performed under Section
4. Figs. 2 and 3 validate these analytical formulations
through extensive Monte-Carlo simulations. Analytical results
are represented by different line styles for different parameters
while marker ‘o’ is used to represent corresponding simulation
results. For generating simulation results, we have used 106
random realisations of distances d
SU
, d
SA
and d
AU
by creating
random locations of S and U . Firstly, the expression (19) for
Fig. 2: Validation for PDF of log
2
(
γ¯
SU
SA
)
with D = r under eavesdrop-
ping.
PDF flog2(γ¯
SU
SA
) (c) is validated in Fig. 2. It also represents the
PDF of SC CˆE
1,2
for the cases 1 and 2 under eavesdropping
mode under high SNR regime as observed from (29) provided
log2
(
γ¯
SU
SA
)
≥ 0. Hence, it is represented as f
CˆE
1,2
(c) for
further discussion. We have used 106 random realisations of
distances d
SU
and d
SA
to generate simulation results. Analyt-
ical and simulation results are found to be in close agreement
with root mean square error (RMSE) < 10−4. Similarly, Fig.
3, validates the analytical expression for PDF flog2(1+γ¯
SU
AU
) (c)
Fig. 3: Validation for PDF of log
2
(
1 + γ¯
SU
AU
)
withD = R under jamming.
given by (21) which also represents PDF of SC CˆJ under
jamming mode in high SNR regime, as explained in (32).
Therefore, equivalent representation of PDF can be expressed
as f
CˆJ
(c). A close match is observed between analytical and
simulation results with RMSE < 10−4. We have validated the
PDFs f
CˆE
1,2
(c) and f
CˆJ
are for various values of ratio λE , λJ
respectively and analysed the impact of path-loss exponent θ
also. Here, λE reflects the ratio of channel parameters aSU
to a
SA
and λJ represents ratio of channel parameters aSU to
a
AU
for PS = PJ . The effect of relative channel conditions
of legitimate and both attacker links are revealed in Figs. 2
and 3 Higher channel gain of legitimate link compared to that
for legitimate link is found to yield larger realisations of CˆE
1,2
and CˆJ in eavesdropping and jamming respectively. Larger
spread in both distributions is also observed for a larger value
of path-loss exponent θ. Since asymptotic SOP pˆEo and pˆ
J
o in
(30) and (33) respectively are functions of asymptotic SC, SOP
analysis carried out in Section 4 is also verified by analytical
validation of SC.
Fig. 4: SOP validation for R=r=D under eavesdropping.
Fig. 5: SOP validation R = D under jamming.
Figs. 4 and 5 verify the accuracy of closed-form solutions
given by (30) and (33) for SOPs derived through asymptotic
analysis. They are compared with the exact SOPs given by
(25) and (27) in Section 4 under eavesdropping and jamming
modes respectively. Analytical results for the exact SOP are
also compared with Monte-Carlo simulation results and found
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in close agreement. Fig. 4 shows variation of SOP pEo and
asymptotic SOP pˆEo against worst case SNRs as denoted by
γ˜
SU
and γ˜
SA
. Similarly, variation of SOPs pJo and asymptotic
SOP pˆJo are plotted in Fig. 5 against worst case SNRs γ˜SU
and γ˜
AU
. Hereby, γ˜
SU
=
κ
SU
Dθ
, γ˜
SA
=
κ
SA
rθ
, and γ˜
AU
=
κ
AU
Rθ
.
For γ˜
SA
= γ˜
AU
= 0 dB, we observe that results are closely
matching for γ˜
SD
> 7 dB under eavesdropping and γ˜
SD
> 9
dB under jamming. It is also revealed that under the condition
γ˜
SA
= γ˜
AU
= 5 dB, results are in good agreement under
eavesdropping while very low deviations are observed for
γ˜
SD
< 5 dB under jamming. Hence, closed-form results
derived for asymptotic SOP holds good for evaluating SOP for
wide range of practical values of SNR for legitimate as well
as both attacker channels. Henceforth, we refer the asymptotic
SOP as simply SOP.
B. Insight about design parameters
Figs. 6 to 9 deliver the valuable insights about deigning of
system parameters for achieving intended secrecy performance
in accordance with the discussion carried out in Section 5.
The impact of maximum distance D between legitimate nodes
on SOP is analysed in Fig 6 with varying eavesdropping range
r of A. Since r and D reflect the restriction on random inter-
node distances respectively d
SA
for effective eavesdropping
and d
SU
for maintaining QoS under eavesdropping as well
as jamming, we may take extreme values of r = rmax = R
and D = Dmax = 2R to represent a traditional scenario
when no restriction is put on corresponding distances in
terms of these variables. A significant rise in SOP pˆEo is
recorded for D > Do. The results also reveal that D influence
SOP pˆEo more adversely as compared to r. We also note
that, satisfying the condition r ¿ rsat results in constant
SOP for D ≤ Do where rsat is defined in Section 5. For
a typical value of D= 60 m, SOP saturates to 0.11 for
r > rsat = 75 m and becomes independent of a further
increase in eavesdropping range. Fig. 6 also exhibits the
uni-modal nature of pˆEo in r. It shows that there exists a value
of r that gives optimal performance. This optimal value of r
can be utilised by A for posing maximum adverse impact on
the secrecy performance of legitimate communication in an
efficient manner as compared to its extreme value.
Eavesdropping range r (m)
0 50 100 150
S
O
P
pˆ
E o
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
D=30 m
D=60 m
D=90 m
D=120 m
D=200 m
D=300 m
rsat=38 m
rsat=114 m
rsat =75 m
Fig. 6: Insights about r with R=150 m, Do=100 m under eavesdropping.
Remark 1. The SOP pˆEo under eavesdropping can be retained
at a remarkably lower value by meeting the conditions D ≤
Do. Furthermore, from attacker point of view, eavesdropping
range of A can be restricted to rsat instead of its extreme
Fig. 7: Maximum allowed D under eavesdropping.
value for D < Do as no further gain is attained by A
towards secrecy outage. Equivalently, S-U pair can restrict the
maximum separation between them to D
sat
so as to neutralise
the impact of eavesdropping range on pˆEo beyond a given value
of r provided D
sat
≤ Do. It may, therefore, be recognised that
for technologies used for short-range communication like D2D
and IoT, the effect of r gets saturated beyond a certain value
while an important role is played by r in secrecy performance
for technologies used for long range communications.
Fig. 7 provides the insights about D
th
, the maximum value
of allowed D to achieve an acceptable value of SOP po
th
for
various values of po
th
and r with varying R. It is observed that
D
th
exhibits increasing nature with po
th
and decreasing trend
with r. We also find that the value of D
th
linearly increases
with increased R for D
th
< Do or Dth = Dmax. The former
condition happens because of the fact that for D
th
< Do,
po
th
is a function of
D
th
R
. The latter condition is based on
the fact that acceptable value of SOP po
th
is high enough that
maximum communication range can be enjoyed by legitimate
nodes for D
th
= Dmax which is found to be a linear function
of R. Under the former condition, when D
th
exceeds Do with
increasing R, the behaviour of D
th
is illustrated for practical
range of pˆo
th
in Fig. 7. It is noticed that, D
th
fastly decreases
first to meet acceptable SOP po
th
and then gradually decreases
with R. This illustration, thus, can be used as a reference for
the design of secrecy performance aware D
th
.
Remark 2. Under eavesdropping, the large deployment range
supports in the greater maximum allowed S − U separation
D
th
for a given acceptable SOP po
th
provided D
th
< Do or
D
th
= Dmax. For Do ≤ Dth < Dmax, there is no advantage
in increasing R further for the purpose of enhancing secrecy
QoS aware D
th
for a practical range of acceptable SOP.
Fig. 8: SOP under jamming for R=150 m, Do = 100 m.
In Fig. 8 we plot variation of SOP pˆJo with A’s jamming
power PJ and maximum distance between legitimate nodes
D. Results show that for D ≤ Do, pˆJo increases almost
linearly with increased PJ . For D > Do, there is a sharp
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Fig. 9: Maximum allowed D under jamming.
increase in pˆJo . After a point, pˆ
J
o increases gradually and gets
saturated with PJ . For a particular value of D > 200 m and
PJ > 0.5 W, pˆ
J
o does not increase significantly and almost
gets saturated at PJ > 1.5 W which implies that A gets
diminished returns by increasing PJ beyond this. Moreover,
the impact of D is found more detrimental on pˆJo relative to
PJ .
Remark 3. The setting of D ≤ Do enables us to retain
a lower level of SOP pˆJo in the presence of A in jamming
mode. Though, degradation is significant for D > Do, A
gets diminishing returns by increasing PJ beyond a certain
point. Therefore, in short-range communication technologies
like D2D, jamming power plays a more important role in de-
grading secrecy performance. Whereas in long-range commu-
nication technologies, the role of jamming power diminishes
after a certain point.
These observations reflect that proposed model aids to
analyse secrecy performance in a better way as compared to
the traditional scenario when real-life constraints in terms of
distance thresholds are not considered. Then the maximum
allowed S−U separation D
th
, for the acceptable SOP po
th
=
0.01 and 0.1 are plotted with different values of PJ in Fig. 9
for jamming mode. It is observed that D
th
increases linearly
with R for a given acceptable SOP po
th
because po
th
is a
function of
D
th
R
. This D
th
is found as an increasing function
of po
th
and a decreasing function of PJ . The impact of po
th
on D
th
gets reduced with increased PJ .
Remark 4. The larger deployment range results in large
value of maximum allowed S − U separation D
th
for an
acceptable SOP po
th
under jamming.
To analyse the impact of randomness in channel fading gain
on designing of Dth, we plot its PDF fDth(x) against its
values x under eavesdropping and jamming in respectively
Figs. 10 (a) and (b). We consider the random channel power
gains due to Rayleigh fading with the same mean value as in
Figs. 7 and 9. Channel fading gains
∣∣h
ij
∣∣2 , ∀ i, j = {S,U ,A}
follow exponential distribution. We also find that, Dth in-
creases with an increased ratio of fading gains
|h
SU
|2
|h
SA
|2 for
eavesdropping and
|h
SU
|2
|h
AU
|2 for jamming. This can be explained
by the fact that SOP decreases with an increased ratio of chan-
nel gains
|g
SU
|2
|g
SA
|2 and
|g
SU
|2
|g
AU
|2 for eavesdropping and jamming
respectively. Channel gains consist of a ratio of fading gain
to the path loss, i.e.,
∣∣g
ij
∣∣2 = |hij |2
(dij )
θ , ∀ i, j = {S,U ,A}
(a) Eavesdropping with r = 0.8R
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(b) Jamming with PJ = 2PS
Fig. 10: Impact of channel fading randomness on Dth.
Target Secrecy Rate Cst (bps/Hz)
0 5 10 15
S
O
P
pˆ
E o
,
pˆ
J o
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Eavesdropping r=0.25R
Eavesdropping r=.5R
Eavesdropping r=R
Jamming PJ = 0.5PS
Jamming PJ = PS
Jamming PJ = 2PS
Fig. 11: Variation in SOP under eavesdropping and jamming with R = 100
m, D = 50 m.
where d
SU
≤ D, d
SA
≤ r, d
AU
≤ R. Therefore, for a given
acceptable SOP po
th
, an increase in fading gain ratio leads to
an increase in acceptable value of path loss in S-U link due
to d
SU
for the given parameters. This, in turn, increases the
maximum allowed S-U separation Dth. These findings lead
to the corresponding pdf of Dth as observed in Figs. 10 (a)
and 10 (b).Increasing values of po
th
shift the curve towards
right in the sense that the larger realisations of Dth become
more likely and vice versa.
C. Relative Severity of Eavesdropping and Jamming
As discussed in Section 5, for a given secrecy rate threshold
Cst and channel parameters, there exists a corresponding
threshold for distance threshold Do such that for Cst ≤
log2(1 +
κ
SU
Dθ
) or equivalently D ≤ Do, outage is caused by
A only. For this scenario, under eavesdropping pEo initially
increases with increased r and saturates after reaching α =
r2/R2. For Cst > log2(1 +
κ
SU
Dθ
) or equivalently D > Do,
there is a sharp increase in SOP caused by randomness in
propagation losses along with security breach due to presence
of A because there is no guarantee to support the high secrecy
rate Cst by legitimate link. SOPs pˆ
E
o and pˆ
J
o increases with r
and PJ in eavesdropping and jamming respectively.
We observe that under the same channel conditions for
eavesdropping and jamming link, A in jamming mode with
PJ < PS yields SOP pˆ
J
o less than pˆ
E
o in eavesdropping
mode with r = R. Hence, under these conditions, A prefers
eavesdropping relative to jamming to cause the maximum
secrecy outage to the legitimate nodes. However, for r < R,
jammer becomes more harmful than eavesdropper beyond
a definite Cst. This condition is true for both cases: with
PJ < PS and PJ ≥ PS . At a very low value of Cst (near to
zero), SOP is higher under eavesdropping because there may
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be a probability of zero SC which includes the probability of
negative secrecy capacity as defined by (4), whereas there is
always positive SC under jamming.
Remark 5. By maintaining D ≤ Do, SOP pˆEo in eavesdrop-
ping can be limited to α = r2/R2. Furthermore, eavesdrop-
ping has more severe impact on secrecy performance than
jamming for the same channel conditions for eavesdropping
and jamming link unless r < R or PS < PJ .
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposes a novel QoS-aware stochastic system
model and investigates the impact of random inter-node dis-
tances under eavesdropping as well as jamming. Development
of ratio distribution of legitimate to attacker link SNR for
the proposed system in closed-form makes an important and
significant contribution in the knowledge domain. This has
enabled us to derive novel closed-form expressions for SOP.
Analytical expressions have been validated against simulation
results with almost perfect match. New insights are drawn for
designing of system parameters in order to achieve the desired
SOP. The proposed model has been shown to design maximum
S-U separation for achieving desired secrecy performance.
From attacker point of view, it is shown through numerical
results that an optimal value of eavesdropping range can
be designed to cause maximum secrecy outage. It is also
shown that no gain is achieved by A beyond a threshold
value of eavesdropping range for given conditions. In the
case of jamming, A gets a diminishing returns beyond a
threshold value of jamming power. Also, the conditions are
discussed under which there is a linear increment in the
maximum allowed separation between legitimate nodes with
increased deployment range for an acceptable SOP. Finally,
we compare the severity of eavesdropping and jamming in
terms of secrecy outage. It is observed that for the same set of
channel conditions for S-A and A-U links, A must have more
transmit power than S to pose more secrecy outage in jamming
than eavesdropping provided that it is capable to eavesdrop
in entire deployment range. It is, therefore, established that
the proposed analytical model offers a reference framework
for inferring deep insights into functioning of eavesdropping
and jamming. It can also be leveraged as an analytical design
tool for determining system parameters to achieve the required
secrecy performance.
REFERENCES
[1] B. Ahuja, D. Mishra, and R. Bose, “Novel QoS-aware physical layer
security analysis,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Shanghai, China, May 2019, pp.
1–6.
[2] A. Mukherjee, “Physical-layer security in the Internet of Things: Sensing
and communication confidentiality under resource constraints,” Proc.
IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1747–1761, Oct. 2015.
[3] R. Zhang, X. Cheng, and L. Yang, “Cooperation via spectrum sharing for
physical layer security in Device-to-Device communications underlaying
cellular networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 8, pp.
5651–5663, Aug. 2016.
[4] R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han, and B. Jiao, “Physical layer security for
two-way untrusted relaying with friendly jammers,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3693–3704, Oct. 2012.
[5] B. Li, Y. Zou, J. Zhou, F. Wang, W. Cao, and Y. Yao, “Secrecy
outage probability analysis of friendly jammer selection aided multiuser
scheduling for wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 67, no. 5,
pp. 3482–3495, May 2019.
[6] ——, “Secrecy outage probability analysis of friendly jammer selection
aided multiuser scheduling for wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Com-
mun., vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 3482–3495, May 2019.
[7] Y. Zou, “Physical-layer security for spectrum sharing systems,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1319–1329, Feb. 2017.
[8] X. Liu, “Outage probability of secrecy capacity over correlated log-
normal fading channels,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 289–
292, Feb. 2013.
[9] L. Lv, Z. Ding, Q. Ni, and J. Chen, “Secure MISO-NOMA transmission
with artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 6700–
6705, July 2018.
[10] N. S. Ferdinand, D. B. da Costa, and M. Latva-aho, “Effects of outdated
CSI on the secrecy performance of MISO wiretap channels with transmit
antenna selection,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 864–867,
May 2013.
[11] X. Li, J. Li, and L. Li, “Performance analysis of impaired SWIPT
NOMA relaying networks over imperfect Weibull channels,” IEEE Syst.
J., pp. 1–4, 2019, early access.
[12] P. C. Pinto, J. Barros, and M. Z. Win, “Physical-layer security in
stochastic wireless networks,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC),
Guangzhou, China, Nov. 2008, pp. 974–979.
[13] ——, “Secure communication in stochastic wireless networks part I:
Connectivity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp.
125–138, Feb. 2012.
[14] W. Liu, Z. Ding, T. Ratnarajah, and J. Xue, “On ergodic secrecy capacity
of random wireless networks with protected zones,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6146–6158, Aug. 2016.
[15] M. A. Kishk and H. S. Dhillon, “Coexistence of RF-powered IoT and
a primary wireless network with secrecy guard zones,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1460–1473, Mar. 2018.
[16] S. Srinivasa and M. Haenggi, “Distance distributions in finite uniformly
random networks: Theory and applications,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.,
vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 940–949, Feb. 2010.
[17] F. Tong and J. Pan, “Random-to-random nodal distance distributions in
finite wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 11, pp.
10 070–10 083, Nov. 2017.
[18] F. Tong, Y. Wan, L. Zheng, J. Pan, and L. Cai, “A probabilistic distance-
based modeling and analysis for cellular networks with underlaying
device-to-device communications,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 451–463, Jan. 2017.
[19] G. T. Amariucai and S. Wei, “Half-duplex active eavesdropping in fast-
fading channels: A block-markov wyner secrecy encoding scheme,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 7, pp. 4660–4677, Jul. 2012.
[20] A. Garnaev, M. Baykal-Gursoy, and H. V. Poor, “A game theoretic
analysis of secret and reliable communication with active and passive
adversarial modes,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 3, pp.
2155–2163, Mar. 2016.
[21] B. Ahuja, D. Mishra, and R. Bose, “Optimal green hybrid attacks in
secure IoT,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., pp. 1–1, 2019, early access.
[22] L. Lv, Z. Ding, J. Chen, and N. Al-Dhahir, “Design of secure NOMA
against full-duplex proactive eavesdropping,” IEEE Wireless Commun.
Lett., vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1090–1094, Aug. 2019.
[23] B. Ahuja, D. Mishra, and R. Bose, “Fairness-aware subcarrier allocation
to combat full duplex eavesdropping and jamming attacks in IoT,” in
Proc. IEEE ICC, Dublin, Ireland, 2020, pp. 1–6, accepted.
[24] H. Chen, X. Tao, N. Li, Y. Hou, J. Xu, and Z. Han, “Secrecy performance
analysis for hybrid wiretapping systems using random matrix theory,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1101–1114, Feb.
2019.
[25] H. Masoumi and M. J. Emadi, “Performance analysis of cell-free
massive MIMO system with limited fronthaul capacity and hardware
impairments,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., pp. 1–1, 2019, early
access.
[26] X. Li, J. Li, Y. Liu, Z. Ding, and A. Nallanathan, “Residual transceiver
hardware impairments on cooperative NOMA networks,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., pp. 1–1, 2019, early access.
[27] X. Li, M. Liu, C. Deng, P. T. Mathiopoulos, Z. Ding, and Y. Liu, “Full-
duplex cooperative NOMA relaying systems with I/Q imbalance and
imperfect SIC,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., pp. 1–1, 2019, early
access.
[28] E. Ahmed and A. M. Eltawil, “On phase noise suppression in full-duplex
systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 1237–1251,
Mar. 2015.
15
[29] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications, 1st ed. Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
[30] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” The Bell System Technical
Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[31] Q. Zhu, W. Saad, Z. Han, H. V. Poor, and T. Baar, “Eavesdropping and
jamming in next-generation wireless networks: A game-theoretic ap-
proach,” in Proc. IEEE Military Commun. Conf. (MILCOM), Baltimore,
USA, Nov. 2011, pp. 119–124.
[32] J. Y. Ryu, J. Lee, and T. Q. S. Quek, “Transmission strategy against
opportunistic attack for MISO secure channels,” IEEE Commun. Lett.,
vol. 20, no. 11, pp. 2304–2307, Nov. 2016.
[33] S.-J. Tu and E. Fischbach, A New Geometric Probability Technique for
an N-Dimensional Sphere and Its Applications, math-ph/0004021 ed.
arxiv.org, 2000, vol. arXiv preprint.
[34] E. W. Weisstein, “Incomplete Beta Function,” accessed Sep. 25, 2018,
http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002/databases.asp.
[35] P. Omiyi, H. Haas, and G. Auer, “Analysis of TDD cellular interference
mitigation using busy-bursts,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6,
no. 7, pp. 2721–2731, Jul. 2007.
[36] A. Papoulis and S. U. Pillai, Probability, Random Variables, and
Stochastic Processes, 4th ed. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2002.
[37] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wire-
less information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2515–2534, June 2008.
[38] I. R. I.S. Gradshteyn, Table of Integrals, series and products, 7th ed.
Elseveir, 2007.
[39] R. Rezaei, S. Sun, X. Kang, Y. L. Guan, and M. R. Pakravan, “Secrecy
throughput maximization for full-duplex wireless powered IoT networks
under fairness constraints,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 4, pp.
6964–6976, Aug. 2019.
[40] M. Andersson, “Short range low power wireless devices and Internet of
Things (IoT),” U-Blox, Tech. Report,, Tech. Rep., 2015.
